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NOTES
THE USE OF HYPNOSIS TO REFRESH MEMORY:
INVALUABLE TOOL OR DANGEROUS
DEVICE?*
Two recent cases exemplify the controversy surrounding the use of
hypnosis, an increasingly popular technique for enhancing the recall of
witnesses to crimes.' In the first case,' a young man who witnessed an
assault was unable to describe the assailant. He agreed to undergo
hypnosis3 to enhance his memory.4 After hypnosis, he described the
assailant in convincing detail and recalled attending high school with
him.5 At trial, however, an ophthalmologist demonstrated that the wit-
ness could not possibly have clearly seen the assailant's face.6 Other
evidence established the inaccuracy of the high school memory.7 The
suspect was acquitted.
* The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Dr. Martin T. Orne, Mr.
Ephraim Margolin, and Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried.
1. By 1981, over 1000 detectives in the United States had been taught the use of hypnotism.
Graham, Should Our Courts Reject H)pnosis?, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 25, 1981, (Magazine)
at 10. See also Levitt, The Use of Hpnosis to "Freshen" the Memory of Witnesses or Victims,
TRIAL, April, 1981, at 56. Levit notes that the use of hypnosis in the legal process has increased
dramatically in the last three years. Id.
2. People v. Kempinsky, No. W80CF352 (Cir. Ct., Will. Co., Ill., Dec. 21, 1980) reportedin
Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hpnosis in Court, in 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW
OF RESEARCH 61, 87-88 (Torry and Morris eds. 1981).
3. "[Hlypnosis ... refers to a sleeplike state that nevertheless permits a wide range of be-
havioral responses to stimulation .... Even memory and awareness of self may be altered by
suggestion, and the effects of the suggestions may be extended (post hypnotically) into subsequent
waking activity." 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 133 (15th ed. 1974). For historical information
on hypnosis, see id. at 134; Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a
Prospectire Witness, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 313, 317-21 (1980); Spector & Foster, Admissibiliy of Hyp-
notic Statements: Is the Law of Eridence Susceptible?, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 567, 567-68 (1977).
4. While under hypnosis, the witness was told that his mind could function as a television
camera, and that he had the ability to "zoom-in" for a close-up view of the assailant's face. Orne,
supra note 2, at 87-88 (citing People v. Kempinsky, No. W80CF352 (Cir. Ct., Will. Co., Ill., Dec.
21, 1980)).
5. The witness recalled that the assailant was a senior at his high school while he was a
sophomore. Id.
6. The assailant was more than 250 feet away from the witness at all times. Under the
weather conditions existing on the night of the crime, the witness could not have identified anyone
at a distance greater than 30 feet. Id.
7. The accused could not have been a senior at the witness' high school because the accused
dropped out of school in the tenth grade. Id.
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In the second case,' a woman, her husband, and their children sur-
prised a burglar in their home.' The burglar killed the husband and
fled. The wife became hysterical when questioned by police about the
incident. The oldest child was vague and unresponsive. During and
following hypnosis, however, both the wife and the child described the
murderer in detail. From their descriptions, the police drew a picture
and arrested a suspect. Strong circumstantial evidence' ° linked him to
the crime.
Meanwhile, however, the Supreme Court of Arizona had ruled that
once questioned about a matter under hypnosis, a witness is precluded
from testifying about the matter in court." -In this case, without the
eyewitness testimony, the state was forced to drop its charges. The
mother and child are now forever barred from testifying for or against
anyone accused of the murder.
These two cases merely hint at the complexity of the issues surround-
ing the admissibility of testimony by persons who have been hypno-
tized. An examination of the case law in this area reveals the sharp
disagreement that exists as to the actual effect of hypnosis on the mem-
ory of an individual. Part one of this Note describes that case law. Part
two analyzes the relevant scientific literature in an attempt to ascertain
whether the new recall produced by hypnotic enhancement is accurate
and whether the use of hypnosis to refresh a witness' memory contami-
nates the original memory. Part three examines the case law in light of
the psychological literature and addresses two critical issues: first,
whether the use of certain procedural safeguards can control contami-
nation; second, whether a court should allow a previously hypnotized
witness to testify on matters remembered prior to hypnosis, or whether
it should absolutely preclude the witness from testifying.12
8. For a description of this case, see Graham, supra note 1, at 9.
9. A shootout ensued between the husband and the burglar. Id.
10. The suspect had checked into a Los Angeles emergency room 10 days after the murder
with a bullet wound and an unlikely story about a hunting accident. Id.
I1. State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981). But see Arizona ex rel. Collins v.
Superior Court, - Ariz. _ 644 P.2d 1266 (1982) (Arizona Supreme Court modified its previous
position, holding that a witness may testify to matters recalled and related prior to hypnosis).
12. This Note does not address the use of hypnosis for purely investigative purposes. As long
as it is unnecessary for the witness to later testify about the subject matter of the hypnotic session,
this appears to create few problems. A recent Arizona opinion recognizes, however, that if a
witness' testimony is essential, and hypnosis will render that witness incompetent, police will sel-
[Vol. 60:1059
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I. CASE LAW CONCERNING THE USE OF HYPNOSIS
In Harding v. State, 3 the court held that the use of hypnosis to re-
fresh the recall of a witness relates to the credibility, but not to the
admissibility of that witness' testimony. 14 In Harding, a local psycholo-
gist hypnotized a rape victim. Although she had previously told differ-
ent, incomplete stories, 5 under hypnosis the victim recalled all of the
events surrounding the incident and, after the hypnotic session, testified
coherently in court about those events. 16 The court stated that even if
the witness had told different stories previously or had achieved her
present knowledge only after being hypnotized, only the weight of the
evidence was affected.' 7
Many jurisdictions have followed Harding's rationale in admitting
such testimony.' 8 One court followed Harding in admitting the testi-
dom use hypnosis as an investigatory tool. Arizona ex rel Collins v. Superior Court, - Ariz. _
644 P.2d 1266 (1982).
For a discussion of the use of hypnosis to aid a defendant in remembering information which
may exonerate him, to aid a defendant in recalling details which may incriminate him, or to
enable a party in a civil suit to recall the details of an auto accident, see Orne, supra note 2, at 63-
68.
13. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
14. Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
15. Id. at 233-34, 246 A.2d at 304-05. Initially, the victim reported that she had been ab-
ducted at knife point by three black males, although she had, in fact, been shot. She later recalled
details of the incident and reported that the defendant shot her. Id.
16. Id. at 234-35, 246 A.2d at 305-06.
17. Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306. The court also noted that the witness stated that she was
reciting from her own recollection. The court failed to gather any scientific evidence on the sub-
ject other than that of the testimony of the psychologist who hypnotized the victim.
18. See United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006
(1978); United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Clark v. State, 379 So.2d 372
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979); State v.
Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), vacatedon other grounds, 450 U.S. 1027 (1981); State
v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312
(1971); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982). Accord State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (following United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978)). See
also People v. Lucas, 107 Misc. 2d 231, 435 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (defendant may intro-
duce expert testimony as to dangers of hypnosis in order to educate the jury). But see People v.
Hughes, 51 U.S.L.W. 2053 (N.Y. App. Div. July 27, 1982) (hypnotically produced testimony inad-
missible in New York criminal trials).
For a critique of the Harding decision, see People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145,310 N.W.2d
306 (1981). The Gonzales court viewed the Harding reasoning as riddled with problems. Id. at
155-56, 310 N.W.2d at 311. The court noted that: 1) although all other sources indicate otherwise,
the hypnotist in Harding stated that hypnosis does not result in greater susceptibility to suggestion;
2) the hypnotist was an employee of various law enforcement agencies; 3) the hypnosis was con-
ducted at a police barracks after the defendant was already the prime suspect; 4) the victim modi-
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mony, but went one step further. That court refused to allow the par-
ties to reveal that the witness had been hypnotized, thereby preventing
that fact from reducing even the weight of the witness' testimony. 19
Other courts have refused to accept the premise that the use of hyp-
nosis should only relate to the credibility of a witness' testimony.20
These courts apply the test established in Frye v. United StateS2 t to the
hypnotic technique itself. Under Frye, testimony resulting from the use
of a scientific technique is not admissible unless that scientific tech-
nique has gained general acceptance in its field.22
fled her story while under hypnosis; and 5) the court found it significant that the victim stated that
she was testifying from her own recollection, although scientific studies indicate that subjects are
frequently unable to distinguish actual memories from confabulations. Id.
19. United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979). Other
courts have allowed a previously hypnotized witness to testify, but have not clearly explained why.
In two Georgia cases-Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974) and Emmett v. State,
232 Ga. 110, 205 S.E.2d 231 (1974)-a prostitute became the prosecution's star witness after her
memory was revived through the use of hypnosis. The prostitute was a drug addict and had lived
with one of the investigating officers during the investigation. In Creamer the court asserted: "We
do not agree, however, that the hypnotic sessions tainted fthe prostitute's] testimony. ... 232
Ga. at 138, 205 S.E.2d at 241, relief granted on other grounds, Emmett v. Ricketts, 397 F. Supp,
1025 (N.D. Ga. 1975). In Emmett, the court noted that the prostitute "testified at length and in
detail" and "was cross-examined extensively and thoroughly." Id. at 115, 205 S.E.2d at 235. Cf.
Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 261 S.E.2d 364 (1979) (cross-examination as to hypnosis allowed for
the purpose of determining credibility).
20. See, e.g., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d
18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982); People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 310 N.W.2d
306 (1981); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980); People v. Hughes, 51 U.S.L.W. 2053
(N.Y. App. Div. July 27, 1982); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981).
Cf. Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981) (court noted that the Frye rule (see infra
notes 22 & 23 and accompanying text) had not been adopted in Maryland at the time of the
Harding decision and remanded for application of Frye). But see Commonwealth v. Taylor,
Pa. Super. ., 439 A.2d 805 (1982) (distinguishing Nazarovitch, finding testimony of victim who
had been questioned under hypnosis admissible where there existed a recollection of facts prior to
hypnosis and where there was no attempt to utilize testimony which surfaced for the first time as a
result of the session). See also United States v. Andrews, General Court Martial No. 75-14 (N.E.
Jud. Cir., Navy-Marine Corps. Judiciary, Phila., Pa., October 6, 1975) (hypnotically tainted evi-
dence excluded on grounds of general unreliability and untrustworthiness). Military judges have
interpreted the manual for courts martial as allowing testimony only as to matters remembered
prior to hypnosis. Diloff, The Admissibility of Hypnoticaly Influenced Testimony, 4 Oao N.U.L.
REv. 1, 20-21 (1977).
21. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
22. The Frye court stated: "[W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduc-
tion is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field to which it belongs." Id. at 1014.
Most state and federal courts follow the Frye rule. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scien-
tft Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Haf-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L.'REv. 1197, 1205 (1980).
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In State v. Mack2 3 the court applied the Frye test to hypnotically
enhanced testimony.24 The court observed that not even an expert can
determine whether a memory refreshed by hypnosis is accurate, and
concluded that because the results were not scientifically reliable, the
technique did not meet the Frye test. Mack held that a court should
not ordinarily permit a witness with hypnotically refreshed memory to
testify concerning matters first recalled while under hypnosis.26 The
court also emphasized the importance of safeguards27 to assure free-
dom from suggestion so that the witness could testify about recollec-
tions recorded before the hypnotic session.28
The court in State v. Mena29 also applied the Frye test and found the
use of hypnosis to be scientifically unreliable.3 0 Moreover, the court
noted that witnesses often find it difficult to distinguish matters
remembered prior to hypnosis from matters remembered only during
and following the hypnotic session.31 The Mena court therefore con-
cluded that a court should completely ban the testimony of a witness
previously questioned on the subject matter of the testimony while
under hypnosis.3 a
For criticism of the rule, however, see C. McCoRMICK, McCoRMIcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 203 (E. Cleary, ed. 1972) (although general scientific acceptance is a proper condi-
tion for taking judicial notice, it should not be a criterion for admissibility); Gianelli, supra, at
1250 (accepted the premise, but rejected the standard of Frye).
23. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
24. The court in Mack stated:
Although hypnotically adduced "memory" is not strictly analogous to the results of
mechanical testing, we are persuaded that the Frye rule is equally applicable in this
context, where the best expert testimony indicates that no expert can determine whether
memory retrieved by hypnosis, or any part of that memory, is truth, falsehood, or con-
fabulation-a filling of gaps with fantasy.
Id. at 768.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 771.
27. The court took judicial notice of, but did not adopt, the safeguards set forth in Dr. Martin
Orne's Affidavit of Amicus Curiae, filed in Quaglino v. California, No. 77-1288, cert. denied, 439
U.S. 875 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Orne Affidavit]. See notes 93-99 infra and accompanying
text.
28. 292 N.W.2d at 771. See also State v. Blanchard, 315 N.W.2d 427 (Minn. 1982); State v.
Koehler, 312 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. 1981).
29. 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981).
30. Id. at 231, 624 P.2d at 1279.
31. Id. at 232, 624 P.2d at 1280.
32. Id. Decisions subsequent to Mack and Mena have not always distinguished the holdings
of the two cases. See, e.g., State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, _ 313 N.W.2d 648, 654 (1981) ("better
rule to be that followed in the Mack and Mena cases"). In People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App.
145, 310 N.W.2d 306 (1981), the court asserted: "Two recent decisions from the Minnesota and
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The California Supreme Court adopted a position very similar to
that of the Mena court. In People v. Shirley33 the California court held
that the testimony of a witness who has undergone hypnosis for the
purpose of restoring his memory of certain events is inadmissible re-
garding all matters that relate to those events from the time of the hyp-
nosis forward.34 The Shirley court noted that it would, however, admit
testimony elicited from the witness by the prosecution on a topic whol-
ly unrelated to the events that were the subject of the hypnotic
session.35
Subsequent to Shirley, the Arizona Supreme Court modified its
Mena holding in Arizona ex rel Collins v. Superior Court.36 The court
once again applied the Frye test to hypnotically enhanced testimony,
reaffirming its Mena holding concerning the inadmissibility of such tes-
timony. The court, however, re-examined its previous holding that
courts should also exclude testimony recalled and recorded prior to
hypnosis. It recognized the usefulness of hypnosis as an investigatory
tool, but noted that police will seldom use that tool where the hypnosis
of a witness automatically renders that witness incompetent. 37 The Ar-
izona court observed that three cases from other states, in addition to
the Minnesota decision in State v. Mack, had adopted positions that
exclude hypnotically enhanced testimony, but allow witnesses to testify
about previously recalled and recorded matters.38 Although the court
held that it, too, would now allow such testimony, it encouraged liti-
gants to adopt certain safeguards in order to protect the testimony from
contamination and to provide the court with a record of the
proceeding.39
Arizona Supreme Courts are in accord with the position we adopt in this opinion." Id. at 160, 310
N.W.2d at 314. The court then quoted the conclusion reached in Mack, however, and in a subse-
quent decision, State v. Wallach, 110 Mich. App. 37, 312 N.W.2d 387 (1981), the court held that
testimony recalled prior to hypnosis is admissible.
33. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982).
34. Id. at _ 641 P.2d at 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
35. Id. at _, 641 P.2d at 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
36. - Ariz. _ 644 P.2d 1266 (1982).
37.. Id. at _, 644 P.2d at 1295.
38. See People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 310 N.W.2d 306 (1981); State v. Palmer, 210
Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981); Commonwealth v. Taylor, - Pa. Super. _, 439 A.2d 805
(1982). But see supra note 33.
39. The court suggested that litigants adopt some, if not all, of the safeguards proposed by
Dr. Orne. See infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 60:1059
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In New Jersey v. Hurd,4  the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the problems inherent in the use of hypnosis,4 but refused to
adopt a per se exclusionary rule.4" The court applied the Frye test, but
stated that a court may consider hypnosis reasonably reliable (and ca-
pable of meeting Frye) if the hypnosis results in recollections as accu-
rate as those of ordinary witnesses which are also frequently
inaccurate.4" In determining whether such evidence is comparable in a
given case, the New Jersey Supreme Court instructed the trial court to
consider expert testimony in examining both the kind of memory loss
the hypnosis restored' and the technique employed.45 The court also
adopted several procedural safeguards based on those suggested by Dr.
Martin Orne, an expert witness in the case.46 By adopting these safe-
guards, the court sought to ensure a minimum level of reliability and to
40. 86 NJ. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
41. Id. at 538-42, 432 A.2d at 92-95. The court stated that "[s]everal features of the hypnotic
experience explain why hypnosis, unless carefully controlled, is not generally accepted as a relia-
ble means of obtaining accurate recall." Id. at 539, 432 A.2d at 93.
42. Id. at 541, 432 A.2d at 94.
43. Id. at 538, 432 A.2d at 92. The court emphasized that it did not agree with the courts in
Mack and in Mena that as a precondition of admissibility "hypnosis be generally accepted as a
means of reviving truthful or historically accurate recall." Id. at 537, 432 A.2d at 92. The court
asserted that if the proponent can demonstrate that the use of hypnosis in a particular case was a
reasonably reliable method of restoring memory comparable to normal recall in its accuracy, the
Frye rule is satisfied. Id. at 538, 432 A.2d at 92. Seealso State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d
246 (Ct. App. 1981) (citing Hurd with approval).
Some commentators assert that the testimony of a witness whose memory has been refreshed
through the use of hypnosis should be admissible because the value of the technique lies not in its
ability to uncover accurate testimony, but in its tendency to bring forth forgotten or psychologi-
cally suppressed testimony regardless of accuracy. Spector & Foster, supra note 3, at 584.
44. The court noted the testimony of Dr. Orne that hypnosis is often reasonably reliable in
refreshing the memory of a witness where there is a pathological reason for the witness' inability
to remember. 86 N.J. at 544, 432 A.2d at 95. See Orne, supra note 3, at 69.
45. 86 N.J. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95.
46. Dr. Orne, who is both a psychiatrist and a psychologist, heads the country's major hypno-
sis research laboratory and is Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypno-
sis.
The court's safeguards differ from Dr. Orne's in three respects: (1) The court strongly encour-
ages the use of videotape while Orne considers it absolutely mandatory; (2) Orne requires a brief
evaluation of the subject prior to hypnosis, while the court does not; and (3) Orne notes the impor-
tance of tapes of prior interrogations in order to ascertain that the witness has not been cued as to
certain information, while the Hurd court fails to mention such a procedure. Id. at 545, 432 A.2d
at 96. See also State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (Ct. App. 1981) (adopting Hurd
safeguards); supra note 28 & infra notes 97-103.
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provide an adequate record for evaluating the reliability of the hyp-
notic procedure.47
II. THE SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE
A. Accuracy of Recall Produced by Hypnotic Enhancement
It is all there even if you are not aware of it. Everything that has
ever happened to you, from birth to death, is recorded on your brain
permanently.4 8
So asserted a detective trained in hypnosis. Expert commentators,
however, disagree with that view of the way the human mind' functions.
They argue that information acquired after an event occurs may be
integrated into the memory.49 The experts also assert that what the
witness remembers depends on the context in which he experienced the
event, the knowledge and skills he brought to the event, and the rela-
tion between what the witness remembers and the questioner de-
mands." Experiments suggest that because individuals are more
suggestible under hypnosis,5 ' hypnotized individuals are even more
likely to integrate other data into their memories.5 2
In a 1932 experiment,53 experimenters suggested to deeply hypno-
47. 86 N.J. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96. Other courts have also emphasized the necessity of follow-
ing certain procedural safeguards in obtaining the testimony. But see People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d
18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982) (use of safeguards will not prevent loss of critical
judgment, confabulation, and increase in confidence); People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145,
310 N.W.2d 306 (1981) (use of safeguards may have an "affirmatively detrimental effect" since
they will give the process an "aura of reliability"-jurors may be less critical). In Shirley, the
court maintained that safeguards would result in parades of expert witnesses and special pretrial
hearings with all the concommitant delays and expense; indeed, that errors in admissibility would
jeopardize otherwise unimpeachable judgments.
48. Putnam, Hypnosis and Distortions in Eyewitness Memory, 27 INTL J. CLIN. & Exp. Hyp-
Nosis 437, 439 (1979) (citing White, Hypnosis Given Key Role in Rape Investigation, Amarillo
Globe-Times, July 7, 1977, at 1). See also W. BRYAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HYPNOSIS 203 (1962),
in which the author asserted that we remember everything we perceive through our sensory organs
and must simply "find the correct shelf' in the "warehouse of the subconscious" and "rerun it in
front of our eyes." Bryan, however, mentioned -no experiments or other authority in support of
this assertion.
49. The experiments conducted by Putnam, supra note 48, and others reported in his article
support this theory. See also People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243
(1982) (research convincingly undermines "the videotape recorder" theory of memory).
50. J. Jenkins, Remember That Old Theory f Memory? Well Forget t, 29 AM. PSYCH. 785,
793 (1974). See generally, E. LOFTUS & G. LoFTus, HUMAN MEMORY: THE PROCESSING OF
INFORMATION (1976).
5 1. See supra note 3.
52. See Putnam, supra note 48.
53. Stalnaker and Riddle, The Effect ofHypnosis on Long-Deleyed Recall, 6 J. GEN. PSYCH.
429 (1932).
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tized subjects that they would recall a Longfellow poem they had
learned in grade school. The subjects purported to have much better
recall under hypnosis. A close analysis of the results, however, re-
vealed only a modest increase in recall and a tendency to fabricate ap-
propriate sections54 for those they could not recall.
In another experiment, the hypnosis and attempted regression to age
six of a group of college students resulted in inconsistent responses.5 5
One subject described his sixth birthday party in detail, including his
mother's statements to him at the party in English, although he did not
learn the language until several years later. Another subject talked
about his first-grade teacher and identified her as Miss Curtis. Miss
Curtis was his seventh- or eighth-grade teacher. The researcher noted
that these subjects apparently were drawing upon memories that actu-
ally arose from periods of life other than the suggested period. The
students simply projected the other memories into the suggested time
period.56
In one early study subjects hypnotized and age-regressed to ages ten,
seven, and four were compared to unhypnotized subjects instructed to
act as if they were ten, seven, and four." Experimenters found signifi-
cant differences between the two groups in behavior, mental and emo-
tional functioning, and recall of events that had occurred at that stage
in childhood." In a replication of that experiment several years later, 9
experimenters used a greater number of subjects and controlled other
variables more closely.6" These experimenters found no significant dif-
ferences between the two groups.6' They concluded that age regression
does not result in an actual return to a childlike mental state, or in a
54. The confabulations were in Longfellow's style and were good enough that they were not
readily apparent.
55. See Orne, The Mechanisms ofHg)pnoiic Age Regression: An Experimental Study, 46 J. An.
& SOC. PSYCH. 213 (1951). If, while under hypnosis, a person is told that he is six years old, he
will act much like a six-year-old. This reaction is generally known as hypnotic regression. Id. at
213.
56. ld. at 220-22.
57. R. REIFF AND M. SCHEERER, MEMORY AND HYPNOTIC AGE REGRESSION: DEVELOP-
MENTAL ASPECTS OF COGNITIVE FUNCTION EXPLORED THROUGH HYPNOSIS (1959).
58. O'Connell, Shor, & Orne, Hypnotic Age Regression: An Empirical and Methodological
Analysis, 76 J. AD. PSYCH. 1, 4 (1970) (monograph issue).
59. Id. at 1.
60. In the original experiment, the experimenter was aware of which subjects were role play-
ing. In the replication he was not, thus possibly motivating subjects to attempt to "put one over"
on the experimenter. Id. at 4-5.
61. Id. at 25. Accord Putnam, supra note 48, at 445-46 (no difference in recall where answers
Number 3] 1067
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reliving of childhood memories.62
As these and other studies indicate, it is hardly clear that the use of
hypnosis results in a significant increase in the accuracy of recall.63
Some evidence suggests that hypnosis may improve recall where the
memory is related to an emotionally upsetting event.64 The apparent
to objective questions addressed to hypnotized subjects compared to answers of subjects in a nor-
mal waking state).
62. Orne summarized the work on hypnotic age regression in this manner:
Not only is the material recalled during age regression an amalgam of recall from the
proper age, recall from earlier and later ages, fantasies, fears, and hopes, but it is not
possible to distinguish between these by any techniques presently available.
Affidavit of Dr. Martin T. Orne, notarized April 28, 1982, prepared for use upon appeal of People
v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Orne Affida-
vit II] (on file with the Washington Universi&y Law Quarterly).
63. There are no reliable studies showing that a person's recall is more accurate while in a
hypnotic state than under ordinary waking conditions. E. LoFrus, MEMORY: SURPRISING NEw
INSIGHTS INTO How WE REMEMBER AND WHY WE FORGET 58 (1980). One of the earliest studies
in this area found that nonsense syllables were not recalled any better under hypnosis than under
normal waking conditions. Huse, Does the Hypnotic Trance Favor the Recall of Faint Memories?,
13 J. Exp. PSYCH. 513 (1930). Putnam, supra note 49, at 438, criticized a study by Arons, a lay
hypnotist (author of HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (1967)) which reported an increase in
recall. Observing that the study was not well controlled, Putnam noted that Aron's subjects were
first questioned about pictures in a waking state and then under hypnosis, even though studies
have shown that recall for pictures improves with subsequent attempts. Other studies reporting
increased recall have been conducted in the context of police investigations, not under controlled
conditions. See, e.g., Reiser, Hypnosis as an Aid in a Homicide Investigation, 17 AM. J. CLIN.
HYPNOSIS 84 (1974); Reiser, Hypnosis as a Tool in Criminallnvestigation, 46 THE POLICE CHIEF 36
(1976); Shafer & Rubio, Hypnosis to Aid the Recall of Witnesses, 26 INT'L J. OF CLIN. AND ExP.
HYPNOSIS 81 (1978).
Orne suggests that individuals are often able to recall a good deal more while talking to a
psychiatrist than when they are with an investigator. Orne Affidavit, supra note 27 at 26. Owe
also notes that when the effects of hypnosis on increased memory are compared with those of
increased motivation (Cooper & London, Reactivation of Memory by Hypnosis and Suggestion, 21
INT'L J. CLIN. & ExP. HYPNOSIS 312 (1973)), and procedures analogous to hypnosis with un-
hypnotizable subjects (Dhanens & Lundy, Hypnotic and Waking Suggestions and Recall, 23 INT'L
J. CLIN. & ExP. HYPNOSIS 68 (1975)), there is no significantly greater increase in recall with hyp-
nosis. Ore, supra note 2, at 74. Cf. T. BARBER & M. HAM, HYPNOTIC PHENOMENA 29 (1974)
(phenomena known as hypnotism can be explained in terms of such variables as attitudes, motiva-
tions, expectancies, and ability to imagine).
64. Putnam notes that most of the reports of increased recall stem from actual police investi-
gations in which witnesses were emotionally upset. He suggests that hypnosis may aid recall "by
reducing retrieval difficulties caused by emotionally upsetting events." Putnam, supra note 48, at
445-46. The Chowchilla kidnapping case, in which a bus driver and a group of school children
were kidnapped and held underground, certainly involved an emotionally upsetting event. Al-
though the bus driver attempted to memorize the license numbers on two of the kidnappers' vans,
he was unable to recall them until he was hypnotized. He then recalled one of the numbers
accurately, except for one digit. See Kroger & Douce, supra note 63, at 368, for an account of that
case. Cf. supra note 44 and accompanying text (Hurd opinion stresses the importance of looking
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increase in recall in most situations, however, is attributable to a de-
crease in critical judgment.65 An individual who in a waking state
would be unwilling to relate hazy, fragmentary memories may, under
hypnosis, freely relate a mixture of accurately recalled fragments and
confabulated material.66
B. Contamination of Memories Through the Use of Hypnosis
Arizona v. Mena illustrated67 that courts are not only concerned that
the witness' new purported recall is inaccurate but also fear that the
very process of hypnotic enhancement may contaminate all the witness'
memories about the event. The subject may mix the hypnotic implan-
tations with his own knowledge, and may so fuse them together that he
cannot later tell one from the other.6"
to possible pathological reasons for gaps in memory). One author observed that "relaxation pre-
supposes emotional indifference and a security born of the lack of need to defend the ego". Ro-
senthal, Hpnotic Recall of Material Learned Under Anxiety-and Non-Anxiety-Producing
Conditions, 34 J. Exp. PsYcH. 369, 386 (1944) (documented an increase in the recall of meaningful
or emotionally disturbing material, although not in the recall of nonsense syllables). See also M.
PRINCE, THE UNCONSCIOUS (1914); White, Fox & Harris, Hypnotic Hypermnisiafor Recently
Learned Material, 35 J. AB. & Soc. PSYCH. 88 (1940).
65. Orne, supra note 2, at 74.
Under hypnosis, anxiety about making a mistake is reduced, willingness to risk being
wrong is increased, judgment about the consequences of testimony becomes secondary to
suggestibility and hypercompliance, and hey! presto! the memory has been "freshened!"
Actually nothing has happened to the memory at all. What has been affected are re-
sponse characteristics of the witness.
Levitt, The Use of Hpnosis to "Freshen " the Memory of Witnesses or Victims, TRIAL, April, 1981,
at 57.
66. Orne, supra note 2, at 74.
67. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
68. Spiegel, Hpnosis and Evidence: Help or Hindrance, 347 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIENCE
73 (1980). Spiegel noted that "the risk we take in using the hypnotic state to obtain information is
that we may wittingly or unwittingly contaminate the memory of the subject in such a way that we
cannot be certain of its credibility." Id. at 79. The court in New Jersey v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432
A.2d 86 (1981) observed, however, that Spiegel declared in his testimony in that case that there is
a return of critical judgment concerning the material uncovered through hypnosis, and that a
posthypnotic session may be especially useful for allowing a subject to accept or reject his recall.
Id. at 540 n.2, 432 A.2d at 93 n.2.
Orne asserted that subjects hypnotized and told to remember the events of a particular day, may
be able subsequently to differentiate between their earlier recollections and their recollections in
hypnosis, unless (1) they are either convinced before being hypnotized that what they recall under
hypnosis will be accurate; (2) prior to awakening, they are given the suggestion that they will now
remember everything as clearly as they did under hypnosis; or (3) they are given the suggestion
that they will not remember the session itself. Orne observed that suggestions to subjects that they
will subsequently remember the events clearly are now widely used for forensic purposes. Orne,
supra note 2, at 75. But see Diamond, supra note 3, at 314. Diamond contends that "once a
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In one experiment, 69 subjects viewed a videotape recording depicting
an accident. The experimenters questioned half of the subjects about
the depiction under hypnosis and half in a normal waking state. The
hypnotized subjects subsequently could not distinguish between actual
events and those events suggested through the use of leading
questions.7 °
The use of leading questions indicates only one of many ways in
which suggestions may be implanted in the mind of the subject.71
Other ways include the hypnotist's tone of voice, body language, and
general attitude toward the subject.72 Previous communications with
police officers and others involved in the case can also influence the
accuracy of recall.73 Even the context and purpose of the session may
potential witness has been hypnotized for the purpose of enhancing memories his recollections
have been so contaminated that he is rendered effectively incompetent to testify .... After hyp-
nosis the subject cannot differentiate between a true recollection and a fantasy or suggested detail
.... (T)he use of hypnosis by police . . . is tantamount to the destruction or fabrication of
evidence." Id. Worthington also maintains that hypnotizing the witness before the defense gets a
chance to talk with him amounts to destruction of the evidence. Worthington, The Use in Court of
Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony, 27 INT'L J. CLIN. & ExP. HYPNOSis 402, 414 (1979).
69. Putnam, supra note 48.
70. Id. at 444-45. The subjects all felt that they had answered more accurately under hypno-
sis. One woman was confident that the witness' hair was blond and looked somewhat like her
roommate's (the woman's hair was actually dark). Another remembered a license plate as begin-
ning with a certain letter although the number was not actually visible (a friend's plate started
with that letter). Putnam noted that there may be an even greater tendency to distort recall in real
criminal investigations because the witness may have a personal stake in recalling the information.
Id. at 444.
Orne suggests that "objective reliving"--in which subjects are told that they will now recall the
events-without emotion "seems to bring forth fragmentary recall based not so much on the sub-
ject's reliving the experience as upon the hypnotist's detailed questions about what is occurring,"
Orne, supra note 2, at 81.
71. See Margolin & Biren, Opposing,4ccepting Hypnotic Enhancement in Identiication of De-
fendant or as Basirfor Expert Opinion, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 1117, 1126 (E.
Imwinkelried ed., 2nd ed. 1981).
[Tihe hypnotist may subconsciously coerce the subject by "cues" to give desired re-
sponses or simply ask leading questions. The physical surroundings or other people in
the room in which the hypnosis is being done may influence the result. Additionally, the
subject may have a desire to conform, to please the hypnotist, or to achieve symmetry in
testimony.
Id See also Diamond, supra note 3, at 333; Owe, supra note 2, at 93.
72. See Diamond, supra note 3, at 333.
73. Orne, supra note 2, at 93. Orne discussed four cases and the sources which influenced the
"recall" in each. In one case, the victim of an assault had at first been unable to identify his
attacker, but later claimed to be able to identify him under hypnosis. Actually, he had seen some-
one else identify him at a pretrial hearing and knew that he was generally believed to be guilty. In
another case, police officers interviewed a young woman several times thinking that her contacts
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provide suggestions.74
People under hypnosis sometimes "recall" events from their past and
fabricate future events with equal confidence.75 Orne describes a study
in which hypnotized subjects were given the suggestion that it was the
year 2000 and were asked to describe the world.76 Vivid descriptions
resulted. Listeners found the descriptions amusing, for they involved
the subjects' fantasies about the future. As Orne notes, however, where
the fabricated memories relate to events which occurred previously and
are plausible, there is no way for the hypnotist, the subject, or a jury to
distinguish between them and actual recall of what occurred.77
The Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis and the Inter-
national Society of Hypnosis adopted a resolution in response to the
increasing use of hypnosis by police officers. The resolution empha-
sizes that independent verification is the only known way to accurately
distinguish between actual recall and pseudo memories. 78  Dr. Bernard
Diamond, who has served as an expert witness in numerous cases con-
with an ex-boyfriend might shed some light on a murder investigation. Following a hypnotic
'ession, she called the police and related some "memories" which were most likely shaped by her
conversations with the officers and by suggestions made during the session. In two other cases
"memories" were apparently shaped by more unrelated sources. In the first, a doctor's observa-
tion that an internal wound must have been made by a knife led to a change in the victim's
"memory," and in the second the manner in which a lineup was conducted shaped "memories."
Courts determined the testimony inadmissible in all four of the above-mentioned cases.
74. Dr. Diamond observed that "most hypnotic subjects aim to please." Diamond, supra
note 3, at 333. One experimenter found, however, that, with the use of proper question design,
hypnotized witnesses did not confabulate any more than unhypnotized witnesses, and that mem-
ory was significantly enhanced. Griffin, HIpnosis." Towards a LogicalApproach in Using Hpnosis
in Law Enforcement Agencies, 8 J. POL. Sci. & AD. 385 (1980).
75. See E. LoFrus, supra note 63, at 58.
76. Orne, supra note 2, at 77 (discussing Kline & Guze, The Use of a Drawing Technique in
the Ini'esfigation of Hyjnotic Age Regression and Progression, BRIT. J. MED. HYPNOTISM 1, Winter
1951).
77. Orne, supra note 2, at 77. Worthington agrees: "If the subject confabulates, and the
recalled memory is 'eminently plausible' then it becomes virtually impossible for even a highly
trained expert to distinguish such confabulation from actual memory." Worthington, supra note
68, at 414.
78. For the full text of the resolution, see 27 INT'L J. CLIN. & Exp. HYPNOSIs 452, 453 (1979).
Even independent verification may not ensure accuracy. The information used to indepen-
dently verify the witness' testimony may somehow have been transmitted to the witness through a
previous interrogation or conversation. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. See also
Diamond, supra note 3, at 337: "No one, regardless of experience, can verify the accuracy of the
hypnotically enhanced memory. . . . [Elven if it has all the earmarks of accuracy, it may still be
fantasy." Hilgard & Loftus, Effective Interrogation of the Eyewitness, 27 INT'L J. CLIN. & Exp.
HYPNOSIS 342 (1979): "A difficulty of confirmatory evidence is that it may be produced by lead-
ing questions .... " Id. at 354.
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cering this issue,79 asserts that a subject who has had his memory en-
hanced through the use of hypnosis may believe that the memory is
spontaneouss to his own experience. He may be unable to shake that
belief, and will thus be immune to all cross-examination. 8t The sub-
ject's belief in the accuracy of his memory is especially likely to be
unshakeable if the memory is consistent with his prior beliefs or
desires.82 This kind of distorted memory may appear genuine to the
hypnotized subject and will probably not disappear.8"
This hypnotically enhanced memory may also improve the credibil-
ity of a witness in the eyes of the jury. One researcher conducted a
study involving experimental jurors and concluded that jurors attach
undue weight to eyewitness testimony. Moreover, jurors place more
emphasis on the confidence with which witnesses relate their testimony
than on the likelihood that the testimony is accurate.8a Consequently,
instructing a jury to consider the use of hypnosis when assessing the
credibility of a witness whose memory has been hypnotically re-
freshed85 may not provide sufficient protection. The confidence with
which the witness testifies may still unduly impress the jury even
though it is a direct result of the hypnotic session.8 6
79. Dr. Diamond has served as an expert witness on the issues of credibility and admissibility
of hypnotically enhanced evidence in courts throughout the country. Dr. Diamond is both a pro-
fessor of law at the University of California at Berkeley and a clinical professor of psychiatry at
the University of California at San Francisco.
80. Diamond observes that "[ilt is very difficult for human beings to recognize that some of
their own thoughts might have been implanted and might not be the product of their own volition
* * * Normally, mental processes are rationalized and experienced as the product of free will,
even when it should be obvious that they are not." Diamond, supra note 3, at 333-34.
81. Id. at 336. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
82. Diamond, supra note 3, at 336. "[Mjost clinicians and practitioners say that the hypnotist
is unable to manipulate the subject's will. . . . If a suggestion from the hypnotist is counter to
some latent, but more powerful idea or suggestion already dominating the unconscious it may be
refused." Spector & Foster, supra note 3, at 576-77. See also T. BARBER & M. HAM, supra note
63, at 18-20.
83. Diamond, supra note 3, at 336.
84. Loftus, Psychological4sfpects of Courtroom Testimony, 347 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Scl. 27,
36 (1980). Jurors were also influenced by the particular words and phrases used in the testimony.
Id.
85. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
86. See Putnam, supra note 48, at 444 (even though the hypnotic subjects made more errors,
they were just as confident of their testimony as the waking subjects); Worthington, msra note 68,
at 414 (subject himself becomes convinced that what he recalls in hypnosis is the actual memory).
Orne described a California case in which a young girl had given a number of different accounts
of what she had observed on the night of a crime. She also maintained that she could not distin-
guish her memories from her nightmares about the incident. Following hypnosis she was able to
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Not even subsequent hypnosis can reverse the effects of the process
of memory enhancement or alteration.8 7 Thus, it is impossible to trans-
form a witness, whose testimony contains many confabulations and
whose confidence in his testimony stems from hypnosis, back into the
less knowledgeable, but more reliable witness who previously existed.
In light of the above research, it is clear that: the use of hypnosis to
refresh the memory of a witness may contaminate the original mem-
ory;"8 contamination is difficult to prevent because it stems from many
sources;89 no one can determine whether any particular piece of infor-
mation is actual memory or confabulation;9" the use of hypnosis in-
creases the subject's confidence in his (perhaps false) account,
rendering cross-examination ineffective and the testimony itself more
convincing;9' and that there is no accepted method of reversing the al-
tered memory.92
III. THE CASE LAW IN LIGHT OF THE SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE
A. Use of Safeguards to Minimize Contamination and to Preserve an
Adequate Record
Some commentators suggest that cross-examination of the hypnotist
may effectively uncover contamination.9 3 This appears highly unlikely,
however, because of the many sources of contamination and the hyp-
give an account of the incident with complete confidence. Dr. Orne noted that "[t]he hypnotic
process was not utilized in this instance to obtain additional information but to alter the nature of
the witness and to convince her that the events she related under hypnosis had actually happened
that way." Orne Affidavit, supra note 27, at 23.
The court in State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980) asserted that "hypnotic subjects have
been able to pass lie detector tests while attesting to the truth of statements they made under
hypnosis which researchers know to be utterly false." Id. at 769.
Bryan notes that hypnosis may be used to relax the nervous witness. The hypnotist suggests to
the witness that he is intelligent and that he is certain of his testimony. W. BRYAN, supra note 48,
at 193-95. Since such a procedure would effectively thwart attempts to cross-examine the witness
as to the accuracy of his memory, its propriety appears questionable.
87. See Worthington, supra note 68, at 414. In his account of the use of hypnosis in a Cali-
fornia case, supra note 86, Orne asserted that "there is no way in which the process that has taken
place, could be reversed. The defense simply does not have the opportunity to cross-examine the
witness who existed prior to hypnosis." Orne, Affidavit, supra note 27, at 23.
88. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
93. Spector & Foster, supra note 3, at 593-94.
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notist's inability to recognize his own nonverbal cues.94 Cross-exami-
nation of a witness who has been hypnotized is also ineffective, for the
witness honestly believes that he is telling the truth.95
A growing number of courts and commentators advocate the use of
certain procedural safeguards whenever hypnosis is used in questioning
a witness.96 As noted earlier,97 the court in New Jersey v. Hurd adopted
certain safeguards based upon those set forth by Dr. Martin Orne in his
affidavit to the United States Supreme Court in Quaglino v. Califor-
nia.98 The Orne safeguards are the guidelines most frequently cited by
courts and commentators.99 They provide that: (1) only a psychiatrist
or psychologist with special training in its use should carry out the hyp-
nosis. He should receive a written memorandum outlining the facts,
but should avoid any other communication which might affect his
94. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
95. See Diamond, supra note 3, at 330; supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text. "The
dangers attributable to a witness' suggestibility are aggravated when the witness' memory is re-
freshed through pretrial hypnotic induction .... The subsequent opportunity for cross-exami-
nation at the trial is virtually ineffective as a means of assuring that no false suggestions have been
implanted." Spector & Foster, supra note 3, at 593. But see W. BRYAN, supra note 48, at 198. "It
is an entirely erroneous conception that false ideas can be placed in the mind of a witness which
will stand up under cross-examination." The author does not support this statement by citation to
any other authority, nor does he give examples of personal clinical experiences.
96. See United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006
(1978); Arizona exrel. Collins v. Superior Court, Ariz. _ 644 P.2d 1266 (1982); State v. Mack,
292 N.W.2d 764 (1980); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M.
682, 643 P.2d 246 (Ct. App. 1981); People v. McDowell, 103 Misc. 2d 831, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup.
Ct. 1980); State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); State v. White, No. J-3665
(Cir. Ct. Milwaukee Co., Wisc., March 27, 1979); Alderman & Barrette, Hypnosis on Trial- A
Practical Perspective on the Application of Forensic Hypnosis in Criminal Cases, 18 CRIM. L. BULL.
5, 21-22 (1982); Levitt, supra note 65, at 59; Warner, The Use of Hppnosis in the Defense of Crimi.
nal Cases, 27 INT'L J. CLIN. & Exp. HYPNOsIs 417, 428-29 (1979); Note, Hypnosis-Its Role and
Current Admissibiliy in the Criminal Law, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 665, 681 (1981).
97. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
98. No. 77-1288, 1, 25-27, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978).
99. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (Hurd court adopted Orne's safeguards with a
few changes); supra note 27 and accompanying text (Mack court took judicial notice of these
safeguards); supra note 39 and accompanying text (court in Arizona ex re. Collins v. Superior
Court encouraged litigants to utilize Orne's safeguards); State v. White, No. J-3665 (Cir. Ct. Mil-
waukee Co., Wisc., March 27, 1979) (adopted Orne's safeguards with some changes); Levitt, supra
note 65, at 59; Warner, supra note 96, at 428-29.
Alderman does not mention the safeguards listed by Orne, but he does incorporate the same
requirements into his set of guidelines. Alderman & Barrette, supra note 96, at 21-22. The Na-
tional Legal Aid and Defender's Association and the New York State Defender's Association have
adopted his guidelines. Id. at 20 n.75.
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opinion.lO The psychiatrist's involvement in the investigation in any
way is extremely undesirable. He should not be responsible to the
prosecution or to the investigators, but should be an independent pro-
fessional. (2) All contact between the psychiatrist and the individual to
be hypnotized should be videotaped, from their initial meeting until the
completion of the entire interaction.' Prior to the induction of hyp-
nosis, the psychiatrist should evaluate the patient and should elicit a
complete description of the facts as the witness or victim remembers
them.0 2 During the hypnotic session the psychiatrist should strive to
avoid adding any new elements to the witness' description of his exper-
iences, lest he alter the nature of the witness' memories or constrain
them by reminding him of his waking memories.' 0 3 (3) Prior to and
during the hypnotic session no one other than the psychiatrist and the
individual to be hypnotized should be present in the room. 104 If either
the prosecution or the defense counsel wish to observe the session, they
may do so through a one-way screen or on a television monitor.
(4) Tape recordings of prior interrogations are important in order to
document that a witness has not been implicitly or explicitly cued on
certain information which he might report during the hypnotic session
apparently for the first time.
Orne maintains that the use of these safeguards may not prevent con-
tamination. 0 5 Thus compliance with the safeguards should not auto-
matically result in the admission of the testimony, but compliance
100. This safeguard allows later evaluation of the hypnotist's beliefs and possible biases. Orne
Affidavit, supra note 27, at 25.
101. Orne asserts that it is just as important to tape casual comments exchanged before and
after hypnosis as it is to tape the hypnotic session itself. Orne emphasizes the need for presession
taping because the hypnotist may, at that time, give suggestions that will act as posthypnotic sug-
gestions. Id. at 26. But see Diamond, supra note 3, at 339. Diamond concluded that "Ithe only
adequate record of the hypnotic experience would be a videotape of everything that transpired
before, during and after the sessions. Yet that, in itself, would be a powerful distorting factor for
the knowledge that one is being recorded can alter one's attitudes and behavior." Id.
102. Ore states that it is important to record the witness' statements relating to the case before
hypnosis. He also notes that a witness frequently recalls more during conversations with a psychi-
atrist than with an investigator. Orne Affidavit, supra note 27, at 26.
103. Orne, who has served as an expert witness in numerous cases involving the use of hypno-
sis, notes that in every case in which tapes of sessions conducted under hypnosis have been avail-
able "there are clear examples of explicit and implicit suggestions to the subject which
unmistakably communicate what is wanted by the hypnotist and/or other questioners." Id. at 15.
104. "This is important because it is all too easy for observers to inadvertently communicate to
the subject what they expect, what they are startled by, or what they are disappointed by." Id. at
26.
105. Telephone conversation with Dr. Martin Orne (May 11, 1982).
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should create a record which interested persons can examine for
error. 1
06
In a paper recently presented at a meeting of the American Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Science, 0 7 Dr. Diamond0 s asserted that
even scrupulous compliance with the Orne safeguards could not pre-
vent contamination of the evidence.0 9 He discussed the safeguards at
length and made several observations. Dr. Diamond stated, for exam-
ple, that in a widely publicized criminal investigation it would be ex-
tremely difficult to find a hypnotist with an unbiased mind.' l° He
further noted that police budgets would not permit adequate videotap-
ing of the sessions."'I He also stated that if recordings of interrogations
prior to the hypnotic session were available, no evidence would ever be
admissible because the recordings would always reveal implicit or ex-
plicit cues."12
Orne agrees that a widely publicized case creates an increased risk of
contamination, especially where the hypnotist is familiar with the crime
and has had an opportunity to formulate his own opinions.'t 3 He ob-
served, however, that authorities in many situations may question a
witness under hypnosis before identifying a suspect, or before investi-
gators have formulated a theory." 4 In these situations, bias is much
less likely to exist. Orne acknowledges that police departments may
find it difficult to follow his safeguards, but he views his method as the
only method by which courts can protect the defendant's rights.'t '
106. Id.
107. Diamond, The Contamination of Evidence by Hypnotic Enhancement of Memory of W%it.
nesses, (presented in Washington, D.C. on Jan. 6, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Diamond Paper] (on
file with the Washington University Law Quarterly).
108. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
109. Id. at 5-6. Note, however, that Orne does not view the safeguards as always preventing
contamination. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
110. See Diamond Paper, supra note 107, at 6-7.
11. Id. at 7-8. Diamond stated that the tapes presently made of such sessions usually include
only the subject in the field of vision and do not show the nonverbal communications of the
hypnotist. He maintains that an expensive television crew would be necessary in order to video-
tape the entire picture. Id. at 7.
112. Id. at 10.
113. Telephone conversation with Dr. Martin Orne (May 11, 1982).
114. Id See, e.g., State v. Commeau, 438 A.2d 454, 458 (Me. 1981) (court noted that hypnotist
could not have planted a reference to the defendant in the victim's mind since he was not a suspect
until a day after the procedure).
115. Orne Affidavit, supra note 97, at 28.
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Orne perceives his own position as similar to Dr. Diamond's." t6
Viewing the techniques presently used by police hypnotists as very dan-
gerous, Orne also calls for a total exclusionary rule unless courts re-
quire utilization of the safeguards that he advocates." t7  Nevertheless,
Orne considers hypnosis a useful investigatory technique and is unwill-
ing to abandon its use completely 18
In adopting the diluted version of the Orne safeguards, t" 9 the Hurd
court encouraged, but did not require, the use of video tape, and did
not require an evaluation of the subject prior to hypnosis. Further-
more, the court did not mention the importance of recording previous
interrogations. Because suggestions may stem from numerous
sources, 120 a complete record is absolutely necessary. Certainly the
Orne safeguards provide a much better record than those adopted by
the Hurd court.
Much controversy surrounds the recent surge 12 in the use of hypno-
sis by law enforcement officers. Orne and the Resolution adopted by
the professional societies, 122 stress the first safeguard listed in Orne's
affidavit, 123 namely, use of the technique only by professionals. 124 Pro-
fessionals contend that police hypnotists are more likely to contaminate
the testimony 125 and that psychological harm may result from hypnosis
conducted by a police officer.' 26
116. Telephone conversation with Dr. Martin Orne (May 11, 1982).
117. Telephone conversations with Dr. Martin Orne (November 5, 1981 and May 11, 1982).
Butsee People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, - n.24, 641 P.2d 775, 787 n.24, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 255
n.24 (1982) (as Hurd recognized, even an expert examining videotape may not identify all cues).
118. Telephone conversation with Dr. Martin Orne (May 11, 1982).
119. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 1. "The police, as well as many attorneys, have found that hypnosis can
save many hours of investigation and produce a more reliable witness, all at minimum expense."
Rothblatt, The Mental Probe Continued-Hpnosis and Witness Preparation, 4 Am. J. TRIAL AD-
VOCACY 615, 615 (1981).
122, See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
123, See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
124. "[This organization] views with alarm the tendency for police officers with minimal train-
ing in hypnosis and without a broad professional background in the healing arts employing hyp-
nosis to presumably faciliate recall of witnesses or victims privy to the occurrence of some crime."
27 INT'L J. CLIN. & Exp. HYPNOSIS 452, 453 (1979).
125. The first of Orne's safeguards emphasizes that the hypnotist should know very little about
the facts of the case, should have no involvement in the investigation, and should not be responsi-
ble to the prosecution or the investigators. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. See also
supra note 78 and accompanying text.
126. Feldman, Hpjpnosts: Look Me in the Ej'e and Tell Me That's Admissible, 8 BARRISTER 4, 6
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Martin Reiser, founder of the Los Angeles police department's hyp-
nosis program, disagrees. He dismisses the idea that the increased sug-
gestability of the hypnotic state makes an individual more prone to
influence by leading questions.127  He contends that hypnosis con-
ducted by a police officer can be therapeutic, 28 and that persons prop-
erly trained in investigative hypnosis know how to question a subject to
avoid opening "emotional cans of worms .... ,,129 Both Reiser and
Harry Arons, a lay hypnotist, view the possibility of psychological
harm to a subject in a session conducted by a lay hypnotist as insignifi-
cant. 30 Neither Reiser nor Arons are impartial advocates, t3 ' however,
(1981). Orne notes that a rape victim, for example, may need to discuss her feelings about the
rape. A psychiatrist can use an age regression approach which will not only help the victim to
overcome the psychological trauma, but may also allow her to remember information that can
help the investigation. Only a professional can use this procedure, however, for the hypnotist
must be able to help the victim cope with intense emotion. A police hypnotist, on the other hand,
suggests to the victim that she can watch the events on a television screen-without emotion-thus
discouraging any expression of emotion.
Orne maintains that when victims or witnesses are willing to help in an investigation, the state
has an obligation to protect them from psychological damage.
A related issue arises where courts hold the testimony of a person who has been hypnotized
concerning the subject matter of the proposed testimony to be per se inadmissible. Does such a
ruling deprive a rape victim, for example, of her right to proper medical treatment? Hypnosis may
be used to alleviate the consequences of the trauma. A patient might be forced to choose between
testifying and obtaining treatment. Dr. Orne does not view this as a problem. He notes that Dr.
Frankel, a Harvard professor who directs the Beth-Israel rape center, asserts that there are many
ways to treat a rape victim, and that hypnosis has not been used in even one of the numerous cases
treated by his center in recent years. Telephone conversation with Dr. Martin Orne (May 11,
1982). See also Owe Affidavit II, supra note 62, at 32-38.
127. See Holden, Forensic Use of Hypnosis on the Increase, 208 SCIENCE 1443, 1444 (1980).
Hypnosis experts maintain that the Reiser approach represents "a complete failure to understand
the way memory works." Id.
128. Feldman, supra note 126, at 6. Cf. Spiegel, supra note 68, at 79 (individuals may some-
times go into trances spontaneously while being questioned under stress). Spiegel advocates that
all professionals dealing with interrogation become more knowledgeable about hypnosis in order
to recognize and cope with such situations. Id. at 84. See also Kroger & Douce, supra note 63, at
364 (suggesting that psychologists or psychiatrists and trained investigators work as a team).
129. Holden, supra note 127, at 1444. Owe, however, emphasizes that feelings are an integral
part of reliving an experience and that ignoring them may create struggle and conflict. Id.
130. Feldman, supra note 126, at 6.
131. In Arizona ex rel Collins v. Superior Court, - Ariz.., 644 P.2d 1266 (1982), the court
discussed the relevant scientific community whose acceptance must be ascertained in applying the
Frye test. "Acceptance must be by those experts who are relatively disinterested and impartial
and whose livelihood. . . is not intimately connected with approval of the technique." Id. at
644 P.2d at 1285 (citation omitted).
Putnam notes that most of the reports of the effectiveness of hypnosis stem from police investi-
gations. Putnam, supra note 64. Cf. Nachshon & Feldman, Vocal Indices of Psychological Stress,
A Validation of the Psychological Stress Evaluator, 8 J. POL. SCI. & AD. 40 (1980) (noted that the
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because both commercially train police hypnotists. 132
Scientific evidence regarding the effect of hypnosis on recall is unset-
tled.13 3 Courts must confront this issue when attempting to determine
the admissibility of testimony of a witness or victim whose memory has
been hypnotically refreshed. Expert witnesses are not readily avail-
able 34 and when they are available, their testimony on the possible
contamination or probable accuracy of the witness' testimony may con-
sume vast amounts of the court's time.'35 These problems have
prompted some courts to totally ban testimony by previously hypno-
tized witnesses.
Manson v. Brathwaite136 involved an analogous situation that might
provide guidance to courts considering whether to admit testimony of
previously hypnotized witnesses. In Manson, the Court faced the prob-
lem of police lineups that were allegedly so suggestive that they tainted
the witness' identification. The Court refused to create a per se rule
excluding evidence, but held that in deciding whether to admit the evi-
only studies of the Psychological Stress Evaluator (PSE) yielding positive results have been those
reported by the manufacturer and others affiliated with it, or by policemen and private practition-
ers). Id. at 53. Reiser demonstrated that
fninety-one] percent of all the testimony obtained from witnesses under hypnosis was
verified by independent investigation. True, but less than half of the cases in which
hypnosis had been used by LAPD were able to be included in that study. More impor-
tantly, the significance of the witness' testimony for the investigation and the subsequent
trial rarely hinges on 90 percent of his or her testimony.
Levitt, supra note 65 at 58. See also Diamond, supra note 3, at 349. "Further harm is caused by
Iexpert witnesses' (often self-styled and police oriented) who, testifying in the state's behalf, make
extravagant, scientifically unjustified claims about the reliability of hypnotically enhanced testi-
mony." Id.
132. At Aron's Ethical Hypnosis Center, police officers take a week-end course which provides
18 hours of training. Feldman, supra note 126, at 5-6. Reiser currently charges $475 per person
for his four-day seminars. (Information obtained from the Law Enforcement Hypnosis Institute,
Inc., in January, 1982).
133. See supra notes 44-83 and accompanying test.
134. "Unfortunately, there are few experts willing and able to present the facts to the courts.
The number of serious research scientists working with hypnosis is limited, and it requires an
intimate familiarity with both the research and the clinical literature to clarify the problem in any
individual instance." Orne Affidavit, supra note 27, at 24.
135. According to Orne,
the complexity of the issues is such that it requires appropriate testimony for the courts
to fully appreciate the issues involved. The costs that every such trial involves are con-
siderable, not only in terms of money but also in terms of scarce resources on the part of
the courts as well as the prosecution and defense.
Id.
136. 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
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dence, a court should look to the "totality of the circumstances,"t 37 and
especially to factors generally indicative of reliability. 3  The Court
concluded that a total exclusionary rule "goes too far," because its ap-
plication automatically keeps some evidence from the jury that is relia-
ble and relevant.'
39
With previously hypnotized witnesses, as with suggestive lineups, a
per se rule excluding evidence that may be reliable and relevant goes
too far.'4 0 Because a hypnotized subject is extremely susceptible to
suggestion from a variety of sources, however, the court must carefully
scrutinize the hypnotic process utilized. Without such scrutiny, a court,
even aided by expert testimony, cannot determine the reliability of cer-
tain evidence. Although the safeguards promulgated by Dr. Orne are
expensive' 4' and time consuming, their use would result in as full and
accurate a record of the entire process as possible.' 42  Given such a
137. The court noted that in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), the "central question" was
"whether under the 'totality of the circumstances' the identification was reliable even though the
confrontation procedure was suggestive." 432 U.S. at 106.
138. 432 U.S. at 114. The court looked to the factors set out in Nell v. Biggers: (1) opportunity
of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) witness' degree of attention, (3) ac-
curacy of his prior description, and (4) level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation. Id.
(quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200).
139. 432 U.S. at 112.
Usually the witness must testify about an encounter with a total stranger under circum-
stances of emergency or emotional stress. The witness' recollection of the stranger can be
distorted easily by the circumstances or by later actions of the police. Thus, [United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)] and its companion cases reflect the concern that the
jury not hear eyewitness testimony unless that evidence has aspects of reliability ....
The per se rule, however, goes too far ....
Id. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
140. Some courts have held that a witness whose memory has been refreshed through the use
of hypnosis should not be allowed to testify because the technique does not satisfy the Frye stan-
dard. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. As the court in Hurd observed, however,
[m]edical research has established that, to varying degrees, a large portion of the popula-
tion has the capacity to enter a hypnotic trance and that hypnotized subjects who are
directed to do so have the ability to concentrate on a past event and volunteer previously
unrevealed statements concerning the event. In this limited sense hypnosis has met the
test imposed by Frye.
86 N.J. at 537, 432 A.2d at 92.
The exclusion of evidence which may be reliable does "go too far." Courts are beginning to re-
evaluate the Frye standard. See supra note 22.
141. For example, the safeguards require the prescence of a psychiatrist or psychologist
trained in hypnosis and that all contacts be videotaped. This may prove expensive. See also supra
note 110 and accompanying text.
142. Ore's safeguards have other advantages. First, psychologists, psychiatrists, and investi-
gators may be more circumspect in the use of words and gestures, because they may anticipate
examination of all tapes for evidence of contamination. Moreover, fewer opportunities for con-
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record, and testimony by experts who have examined that record,143 a
court may reasonably determine the reliability, and thus the admissibil-
ity, of the evidence.
B. Testimony on Matters Remembered Prior to Hypnosis
Most of the controversy concerning the hypnosis of witnesses in-
volves the use of testimony obtained during or after hypnosis. A re-
lated issue, however, is whether matters remembered prior to hypnosis
are admissible.
In State v. Mack,144 the court suggested that prior statements were
admissible, but emphasized the importance of utilizing safeguards to
protect those memories from contamination. 45 In contrast, the Ari-
zona Supreme Court, in State . Mena, initially excluded previously
hypnotized witnesses from testifying 146 because such witnesses are
sometimes unable to distinguish actual memories from matters recalled
during hypnosis. 147 The court in People v. Shirley 48 also held incom-
petent testimony about events that were the subject of the hypnotic ses-
sion, including those recalled prior to hypnosis. That court, however,
allowed a witness to testify concerning wholly unrelated events.' 49
Questioning under hypnosis probably does not affect a witness'
memory about events not the subject of the questioning. Courts should
therefore allow witnesses to testify about wholly unrelated events. A
court, however, should not admit testimony concerning matters which
in any way relate to the subject matter of the hypnotic session, unless
the proponent complies with the Orne safeguards.' 50 These procedures
provide the court with a full record which it may scrutinize for evi-
tamination should exist, because as many variables as possible will be controlled. Finally, a wit-
ness or victim who is experiencing emotional problems may benefit from the hypnosis, and in any
event, should not suffer psychological damage.
143. The admissibility issue should be litigated either at a pretrial hearing or at a hearing out
of the jury's presence. For more detailed suggestions as to this procedure, see infra notes 166-69
and accompanying text.
144. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980). See also supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
146. State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981). But see Arizona ex re. Collins v.
Superior Court, - Ariz. -, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982) (Arizona court modified its position to allow
testimony on matters recalled prior to hypnosis.)
147. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
148. 31 Cal.3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982).
149. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
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dence of contamination.15
While the Mena and Shirley courts precluded the witness from testi-
fying concerning matters remembered prior to hypnosis, they did sug-
gest one possible method of preserving prehypnotic testimony. The
court in Mena noted that a deposition might be used to preserve a wit-
ness' prehypnotic testimony.'52 Citing that statement from Mena, the
Shirley court observed that certain procedural devices might alleviate
any difficulty of proof.'53
Several states have statutes providing for the use of preservation dep-
ositions or conditional examinations in criminal trials. 154 If a witness is
not likely to be available at a later time, 155 a party may request that the
court order a deposition. The opponent has a right to be present and to
cross-examine the witness at the deposition. If the witness is unavaila-
ble at the time of the trial, a party may introduce the deposition into
evidence as prior recorded testimony. Although there are no reported
cases in which a party has used such a procedure to protect prehypnotic
testimony, it does offer a plausible solution to the problem. Preserva-
tion depositions provide the opponent with an opportunity to cross-
151. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
152. 128 Ariz. 226, 232 n.1, 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 n.l (1981). Rule 15.3(a) of the Arizona Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides:
Upon motion of any party or a witness, the court may in its discretion order the exami-
nation of any person except the defendant upon oral deposition under the following
circumstances: (1) A party shows that the person's testimony is material to the case and
that there is a substantial likelihood that he will not be available at the time of trial;
17 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.3 (1973). The statute also gives the defendant the right to be
present at the hearing, and allows the state to introduce the deposition at trial as prior recorded
testimony. Id.
153. 31 Cal. 3d at _, 641 P.2d at 805, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
154. For examples other than the Arizona statute, see supra note 152, see CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 1335-1345 (Deering 1982); IDAHO CODE ch. 4, § 19-3101 to -3111 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
I 1A, § 414 (Smith-Hurd 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29(a) (Pamphlet 6, 1980). See generally C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at § 253, (E. Cleary, ed., 1972).
155. Both the Arizona and Illinois statutes require only that it appear that a witness may later
be "unavailable." The New Mexico statute requires that he be uncooperative or unable to attend
trial. The California and Idaho statutes, however, require that he be "about to leave the state" or
"so sick or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds for apprehension that he will be unable to
attend the trial .. " See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1336 (Deering 1982). In jurisdictions where
the statutes contain specific "grounds for application" such as New Mexico, California, and Idaho,
a party probably could not utilize the statute to preserve prehypnotic testimony. The legislature
could, however, easily amend the statute to include hypnosis as one of the "grounds." In contrast,
the statutory language in jurisdictions such as Arizona and Illinois could easily apply to a situa-
tion in which a party plans to "enhance" a witness' memory through hypnosis.
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examine the witness. Furthermore, the procedure does not force the
proponent to choose between protecting a witness' testimony from con-
tamination, and hypnotizing that witness in order to obtain further
information.
In a jurisdiction which does not allow preservation depositions, one
of the exceptions to the hearsay rule may provide grounds for admit-
ting a record of prehypnotic testimony.' 56 Under 803(5) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, for example, a proponent may read into evidence a
record of information previously related but now forgotten by the wit-
ness. t57 In order to trigger this exception, a witness must reduce the
record to writing shortly after the event. If the police made a record by
making the witness' oral recollections part of the police report, a party
might argue admissibility on the theory that the report was cooperative
past recollection recorded.'58 Under Rule 803(24), a record may be ad-
missible if it has "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"
equivalent to those of the other hearsay exceptions. '59 Courts generally
construe this exception quite narrowly, however.1
6 0
In People v. Shirley, the court held that the witness' testimony at the
preliminary hearing, prior to the hypnotic session, would be admissible
upon retrial because the hypnotic session had rendered the witness un-
available within the meaning of the former testimony exception to the
156. See FED. R. EvID. 803, 804. For a detailed discussion of the hearsay exceptions, see C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at §§ 244-324.
157. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is avail-
able as a witness:
(5) Recorded recollection, a memorandum or record concerning a matter about which
a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable him to
testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when
the matter was fresh in his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted,
the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as
an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.
FED. R. EVID. 803(5).
158. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at §§ 303, 714.
159. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide in part:
A statement not specifically covered. . . but having equivalent circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (a) the statement is offered as evi-
dence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable
efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests ofjustice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence.
FED. R. EvID. 803(24).
160. lmwinkelried, The Scope of the Residual Hearsay Exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. 15 SAN Dmoo L. Rnv. 239 (1978).
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hearsay rule. 16 1 Under the California Evidence Code a witness is un-
available to testify if he is "disqualified from testifying to the mat-
ter."' 62 Thus, in jurisdictions which include similar definitions of
unavailability, 163 courts may allow the admission of testimony given at
a hearing prior to hypnosis, as well as testimony recorded in a deposi-
tion' 6" under the former testimony exception.
IV. CONCLUSION
Most experimenters who have examined the effect of hypnosis on
recall have concluded that more research is needed. 65 Perhaps some-
day experts will have the ability to examine a previously hypnotized
witness and distinguish accurate from false memories. At present,
however, the testimony of a witness whose memory has been refreshed
by hypnosis should be admissible only if there has been strict compli-
ance with the safeguards proposed by Dr. Orne, so that the procedures
themselves can be examined.
Ideally, states should enact statutes dealing with this matter. 166 Such
statutes should include requirements for total compliance with each of
the Orne safeguards, submission of an affidavit outlining the details of
compliance with each safeguard, and submission of all videotapes and
other materials to both the court and the opposing party.
The statute should prohibit the admission of hypnotically enhanced
testimony where a proponent cannot demonstrate compliance with the
procedural safeguards. Where a proponent demonstrates compliance,
however, the statute should require a pretrial hearing on the admissi-
bility of the testimony. At that hearing, the court should allow parties
161. 31 Cal.3d 18, _ 641 P.2d 775, 808, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 276 (1982). See CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1291(a) (Deering 1966 & Supp. 1982).
162. CAL. EVID. CODE § 240(a)(2) (Deering 1966 & Supp. 1982).
163. Rule 804(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence does not include California's characteriza-
tion of "unavailability" in its definition of that term.
164. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
165. Hilgard & Loftus, supra note 77, at 354 (1979); Orne, supra note 2, at 101; Putnam, sufpra
note 48, at 446; Worthington, supra note 67, at 415.
166. At least one state has enacted such a statute. See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 136.675 to .695
(1979). This statute renders hypnotically enhanced testimony inadmissible unless the parties have
complied with certain procedural safeguards. Id. The requisite safeguards, however, are not
stringent enough. Although the statute requires that the entire procedure be recorded on a
"mechanical recording device," it does not require videotape. It does not suggest that previous
interrogations be recorded. d. § 136.675. Unless the witness requests a licensed medical doctor
or a licensed psychologist, a law enforcement officer may conduct the sessions, Id. § 136.685.
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to introduce expert testimony regarding the presence or absence of con-
taminating factors. If the court finds that the evidence does not appear
contaminated, it may admit the evidence.
Parties should introduce expert testimony at trial to explain to the
jury that the use of hypnosis to enhance recall can contaminate memo-
ries. 16 7 Because the issue of actual evidence of contamination in that
particular record will already have been litigated at the pretrial hear-
ing, the parties should not relitigate that matter at trial. In their testi-
mony, experts should assume that the record is free of any real
evidence of contamination.
6
The court should allow the proponent to take the witness' deposition
before subjecting him to hypnosis. If, subsequent to the hypnotic ses-
sion, the witness is held incompetent, the court should allow admission
of that deposition at trial. 16
9
The requirements outlined above are stringent ones. Hypnosis as
presently used by police hypnotists, however, is very dangerous. Some
commentators do not believe that any safeguards can provide sufficient
protection.17 0 Courts and legislatures must balance the public's interest
in utilizing all legitimate tools to obtain evidence upon which to convict
those who commit crimes, against the right of a defendant not to be
convicted on the basis of unreliable testimony. The above require-
ments provide one feasible method of accommodating the confficting
interests. Although the use of hypnosis presents numerous problems,
and the use of stringent safeguards does not provide a perfect solution,
this proposal is preferable to totally excluding what may sometimes be
reliable and relevant evidence.
Deborah J Carter
167. For a discussion of federal cases which have addressed the issue of the necessity and
admissibility of expert testimony where a witness' memory has been hypnotically refreshed, see
Annot., 50 ALR FED. 602 (1979). One commentator has observed that while jurors tend to be
particularly responsive to the confidence with which witnesses relate their testimony, they are still
able to scrutinize the evidence after expert testimony on the reliability of such testimony. See
Loftus, supra note 84.
168. The opponent's expert may, however, point out that contamination can stem from nu-
merous sources, some perhaps not reflected in the record, and he may describe the effects of such
contamination. In contrast, the proponent's expert may discuss the significance of the safeguards
utilized, and the absence of any evidence of contamination.
169. The opponent should, of course, have the right to be present and to cross-examine the
witness at the deposition.
170. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 3; Diamond Paper, supra note 108.
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